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DETERMINING JUST CAUSE: AN EQUITABLE
SOLUTION FOR THE WORKPLACE
Abstract A majority of courts now recognize that an employer's implied promise to
discharge an employee only for just cause is an exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine. These courts, however, have not articulated a clear definition ofjust cause nor have
they established a consistent standard for a jury's review of employer discharge decisions.
This Comment suggests that courts develop strict guidelines for determining if an
employee's conduct is just cause for discharge. Further, this Comment proposes that
courts adopt a standard of review that requires the jury to balance employer and employee
interests.
The United States is one of the few industrialized countries that
denies job security to the vast majority of its workers.1 While other
countries provide workers with protection from discharge without just
cause, 2 in the United States only union and civil service employees
enjoy similar protection.3 The prevailing rule with regard to all other
employees is the at-will employment doctrine.4 This doctrine allows
employers to discharge employees for good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all.5 Employee rights advocates have urged that just cause
protection be extended to all employees.6 The courts, recognizing the
injustice7 of the at-will employment rule, have been responsive to these
urgings.' Despite their willingness to extend more protection to a
broader base of employees, however, the courts have not articulated a
clear definition of just cause, nor have they agreed whether an
employer's determination of just cause should be held to an objective
1. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute 62 VA. L.
REv. 481, 508 (1976); see id. at 508-19 (specific job protection provisions in France, Germany,
Great Britain and Sweden).
2. Id. at 508. This standard, established by the International Labor Organization, limits
dismissal to cases where "there is a valid reason ... connected with the capacity or conduct of
the worker or based on the [employer's] operational requirements." Id at 508-09.
3. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST.
LJ. 1, 8-9 (1979).
4. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 1404, 1405 (1967). For a complete history of the at-will
employment doctrine, see H. PERRrT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1-23
(1984).
5. Blades, supra note 4, at 1405 (citing Payne v. Western & Atl. RR., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)).
6. Massingale, At-Will Employment Going, Going..., 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 187, 204 (1990);
St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 56, 71 (1988); Summers, supra note 1, at 519-21.
7. See H. PERRrrT, supra note 4, at 13-17.
8. See, eg., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
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or subjective standard. The following hypothetical illustrates the
problem:
Employer, Acme Company, provides an employee handbook to all its
employees. The handbook states that employees will be terminated only
for "'just cause." Three Acme employees approach an Acme manager
with information that Bob, another Acme employee, has been seen drink-
ing at work The manager obtains written reports from all three employ-
ees and investigates the allegations. During the investigation, the
manager finds an empty liquor bottle in Bob's trash can and smells alco-
hol on Bob's breath. The manager promptly discharges Bob.
Does the manager have just cause for dismissing Bob? Drinking on
the job is generally accepted as conduct that justifies discharge, so it is
unlikely that Acme's basis for the discharge will be questioned. Nev-
ertheless, the evidence Acme relied on to make its discharge decision is
likely to be challenged. While Acme had convincing evidence that
Bob was drinking on the job, it lacked conclusive proof. Can Acme's
good faith belief that Bob was drinking on the job justify Bob's termi-
nation or should Acme be required to prove its allegation?
The law in this area is unsettled. Clear definitions of just cause and
the standard of review in just cause cases are necessary in order to
create an atmosphere of certainty in the workplace. This Comment
reviews the current definition of just cause, discusses the jury's scope
of review in just cause cases, and proposes applying a more balanced
approach to the determination of just cause.
I. DETERMINING "JUST CAUSE"
The just cause concept dates back to the Statute of Laborers enacted
in 1562. 9 This statute prohibited employers from discharging employ-
ees without a "reasonable cause."1 Most American jurisdictions fol-
lowed this rule until it was displaced by the employment at-will
doctrine, which was established in 1877.1 Just cause resurfaced in the
1930s when unions, concerned about their members' job security,
began including just cause provisions in their collective bargaining
agreements. 12 Like union members, federal, state and municipal
employees also enjoy just cause protection from discharge.1 3
9. Comment, Understanding the Just Cause Defense, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 527, 531 (1988).
10. Id.; I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 425 (1847).
11. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118,
124 (1976). By 1913, the employment at-will doctrine was the law in the majority of the states.
Id. at 126.
12. Comment, supra note 9, at 531.




Recently, courts have extended just cause protection beyond union
and civil service employees into the private sector.14  Today, the
majority of American jurisdictions recognize employee claims for
wrongful discharge if the employee alleges that the employer breached
an implied promise to discharge only for just cause.15 Courts consid-
ering just cause cases must address two issues: first, what is the appro-
priate definition for just cause; and second, who should make the
factual determination that just cause existed.
A. The Accepted Definition: A Fair and Honest Cause
Much of the recent attention given just cause has focused on defin-
ing the term. The difficulty in defining just cause stems from the mul-
titude of possible fact patterns from which a just cause dispute can
arise. 6 Just cause disputes have originated from discharges based on
possession or use of drugs or alcohol,17 insubordination,18 absentee-
ism, 19 theft,"0 and incompetence.21 Although many courts, fearful
that no one definition can apply in all circumstances, have been reluc-
tant to give just cause a fixed definition,' some courts have taken the
variety of fact patterns into consideration in developing a definition of
just cause.23 These courts frequently define just cause as "a fair and
honest cause or reason."2 4
14. See supra note 8 (cases extending just cause protection).
15. 1 L. LARSON & P. BoRowsKY, UNJusT DISMISSAL ch. 8, at 7-9 (1990). For a state-by-
state survey, see J. McCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 206-43
(2d ed. 1990).
16. See R.J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 144, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 558
(1963); Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of Just Cause in Employee Discipline Cases; 1985
DUKE LJ. 594, 599-601.
17. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897 n.39 (1980).
19. Volino v. General Dynamics, 539 A.2d 531 (R.L 1988).
20. LaGoe v. Duber Indus. See., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1459, 239 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1987).
21. Belcher v. Department of State Lands, 228 Mont. 352, 742 P.2d 475 (1987).
22. Comment, supra note 9, at 543.
23. See, ag., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Beaty, 402 F. Supp. 652, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(some reason "which is not arbitrary or capricious"); Hollingsworth v. Board of Educ., 208 Neb.
350, 303 N.W.2d 506, 512 (1981) (conduct rising to the level of "incompetency, neglect of duty,
unprofessional conduct, insubordination, immorality, physical or mental incapacity" or other
conduct that interferes with the employee's performance of his or her duties); Weaver v. State
Personnel Bd., 71 Wis. 2d 46, 237 N.W.2d 183, 185 (1976) ("A cause sufficient at law .... ).
24. See In re Freightliner Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 302, 307 (1990) (Tilbury, Arb.); see also
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 139, 769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989); Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 769, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212 (1988).
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B. Applying the Definition: Who Decides If There Was Just Cause?
The determination of just cause does not end with a factfinder's
decision that the employer's cause was fair and honest.25 The
employer's factual determination is also subject to review.26  A
number of courts have considered the role the jury should play in
reviewing an employer's termination decision. Several opinions have
favored a de novo standard whereby the jury can independently deter-
mine whether the employee did in fact do what he was accused of
doing.2 7 Other courts have limited the jury's review to determining
whether the employer had a good faith belief that the employee com-
mitted the alleged conduct. 28 At least one court has attempted to
merge these two standards in order to balance the interests of both
employers and employees.29
1. The De Novo Standard: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield30 and its companion case,
Ebling v. Masco Corp.,31 were the first cases to address the jury's scope
of review in a just cause dispute. The facts of the two cases are indis-
tinguishable.3 2 Both Toussaint and Ebling were mid-management
employees who had inquired about job security before accepting their
positions.33 Both were assured that as long as they did their jobs they
would be guaranteed continued employment. 34 Toussaint was subse-
quently terminated for insubordination and personality conflicts. 35
Ebling was terminated for poor judgment.36 Both employees brought
actions against their former employers, claiming that the employers
had breached their agreement to discharge only for just cause.37
25. See C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 148
(1983 & Supp. 1988).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896
(1980).
28. See, e.g., Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 101, 643 P.2d 1276, 1279
(1982).
29. See Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 139, 769 P.2d 298, 304
(1989).
30. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
31. Id.
32. 292 N.W.2d at 884.
33. Id. at 883, 884.
34. Id. at 884.
35. Id. at 897 n.39.
36. Id.




In its opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court discussed who should
determine whether the behavior that resulted in the termination actu-
ally occurred.38 The court stated that where an employer agreed to
discharge an employee only for just cause, it is up to the jury to deter-
mine whether the employee was, in fact, discharged for the reasons
stated.39 In such cases, the jury need only review the honesty of the
employer's stated reason for the discharge.
The court, however, established a different procedure for discharges
based on misconduct.' The court stated that in such situations, the
jury must determine whether the employee actually did what the
employer alleged.41 This statement requires the jury to make an
independent, de novo finding regarding the factual basis of the
employee's conduct. Although the court appeared to give the jury
broad discretion in cases of misconduct, the court limited this discre-
tion by stating that its holding should not be interpreted to give
employees the right to be discharged only with "the concurrence of
the communal judgment of the jury."'42
2. The Good Faith Standard: Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp.
In Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp.,43 the Oregon Supreme Court
adopted an entirely different view from that of Toussaint. In Simpson,
the court stated that unless the employer has contracted away its
power to make a decision, the employer retains the right to determine
if the facts that led to the discharge exist." In Simpson, the employer,
Western Graphics, had provided all employees with an employment
manual stating that employees would be terminated only for just
38. Id at 895.
39. Id
40. The court broadly defined misconduct as intoxication, insubordination, and dishonesty.
Id at 896.
41. Id This court delineated the role of the jury even further in a subsequent decision. In
Renny v. Port Huron Hosp.. the court stated that the jury was to determine whether the employee
committed the specific misconduct for which he was fired, whether the firing was pretextual,
whether the reason for discharge amounted to good cause, and whether the employer was
selectively applying the rules. 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327, 335 (1986).
42. Toussaint 880 N.W.2d at 896. Despite this restriction on employee rights, the Toussaint
court did not provide any guidelines that prevent a factfnder from granting this right to
employees. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co. illustrates the tendency of a factfnder to extend the
right of a communal judgment of the jury to employees. 911 F.2d 191, 205 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ('[Tloday's decision makes us the first court in the country to require
an employer to prove to the satisfaction of a jury that employees involved in an inherently
hazardous activity, whom they reasonably suspected of using drugs on the job, were in fact guilty
of doing so.").
43. 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982).
44. 643 P.2d at 1279.
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cause.4 5 Simpson was discharged for allegedly threatening another
employee with violence.' Simpson denied the charge and asked the
court to consider whether he had really threatened the other
employee.47 The court refused. Instead, it upheld the lower court's
ruling that limited the employer's burden to proving it made a good
faith determination of a sufficient cause for discharge based on facts
reasonably believed to be true and not for any arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal reason.48 Contrary to Toussaint, the court held that it was not
necessary that just cause exist in fact.49
3. Moving Toward a Middle Ground: Baldwin v. Sisters of
Providence, Inc.
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc. " attempted to resolve the con-
troversy between the objective de novo and subjective good faith stan-
dards by proposing a middle ground. In Baldwin, the plaintiff worked
as a respiratory therapist for the defendant's hospital.5" A patient
claimed she was molested by a hospital employee whose description
matched Baldwin's.52 After an investigation by Sisters of Providence,
Baldwin was discharged.53 The employee handbook provided that dis-
charge would be limited to instances of "gross violation of conduct."54
In deciding who should determine whether there was just cause, the
Washington Supreme Court combined an objective reasonable belief
standard with a subjective good faith standard.55 The court said that a
discharge for good cause is one that is not for any arbitrary, capri-
45. Id. at 1277.
46. Id.
47. Id. Although the Simpson case was tried to a court instead of a jury, there is nothing in
the court's opinion that suggests the issues would be decided differently if the trial was before a
jury. See id. at 1277-79.
48. Id. at 1278. The Oregon Supreme Court did not discuss what "based on facts reasonably
believed to be true and not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason" means or how this
portion of the ruling would affect the employer's determination. As several other courts have
noted, under Simpson there are no limits on an employer's decision to terminate as long as the
employer retains the authority to make this decision and does so in good faith. LaGoe v. Duber
Indus. Sec., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1459, 239 Cal. Rptr. 445,449 (1987); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil
Co., 108 N.M. 20, 27, 766 P.2d 280, 287 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); Frazier v.
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 82 Or. App. 328, 331, 728 P.2d 87, 88 (1986); Baldwin v.
Sisters of Providence, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 137-38, 769 P.2d 298, 303-04 (1989).
49. Simpson, 643 P.2d at 1279 (Lent, J., dissenting).
50. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
51. Id. at 129, 769 P.2d at 299.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 130, 769 P.2d at 300.
54. Id. at 129, 769 P.2d at 299.




cious, or illegal reason and that is based on facts supported by substan-
tial evidence and reasonably believed by the employer to be true. 6
II. A NEW DEFINITION OF JUST CAUSE
The "fair and honest cause or reason" definition of just cause
appeals to courts because of its flexibility. The benefit of this definition
is that it does not limit employers' discharge decisions to narrow cate-
gories of conduct. Instead, employers are allowed to mold perform-
ance standards according to the needs of their particular workplace.
The appeal of the "fair and honest cause or reason" definition is
limited, however, by the ambiguity of its meaning. "Fair" and "hon-
est" are elusive terms. "Fair" means "equitable, reasonable, even-
handed." 57 "Honest" means "free from fraud or deception.""8  The
characterization of causes and reasons as "fair" and "honest" is mis-
leading. Causes and reasons are not fair or honest-people are.
Instructing the jury that just cause is a "fair and honest cause or rea-
son" shifts the jury's focus away from the reason for termination and
gives it the opportunity to scrutinize the behavior of the employer.5 9
By allowing the jury to make this shift, courts are opening the door
to jury bias. In the jury's collective mind, the question becomes not
"Did the employer have just cause for the discharge?", but rather,
"Was the employer fair and honest?" If the jury is not given any
guidelines for reviewing the employer's decision, they may ignore the
just cause instructions entirely and make a judgment based solely on
how much they sympathize with the employee.' ° The jury may be
tempted to consider each plaintiff's personal circumstances. For
example, if the jury members see an unemployed single mother or a
56. Id.
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1990).
58. WESTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DiCrIONARY 544 (anniversary ed. 1981).
59. C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 144 ("Judicial definitions of good cause
sometimes focus not on the employee's behavior but on the employer's motivation."). The jury
instructions on termination for good cause do little to prohibit the jury from making this shift.
At most, the instruction will give the "fair and honest cause or reason" definition and ask the
jury to balance the interests of the employer and employee in making their determination. J.
McCARTHY, supra note 15, at 506. Other instructions give the "fair and honest cause or reason"
definition with no language modifying the jury's inquiry. WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION PRACTICE 707, 731 (G. Saperstein & B. Silverman eds. 1987).
60. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. This potential for jury bias is illustrated in
three surveys of wrongful termination cases. In one study of 120 wrongful termination cases in
California, the jury found for the employee in 67.5% of the cases. J. DERTouzos, E. HOLLAND
& P. EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 25
(1988). In another study of California jury verdicts, the jury found for the employee in 78% of
the cases. 35 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Feb. 24, 1987). A nationwide study of 260 wrongful
discharge verdicts showed employees recovered in 58.4% of the cases. I. SHEPARD, P.
Washington Law Review
worker with no transferable skills, they are likely to conclude that dis-
charging such a person could not be fair treatment. A more definitive
instruction is necessary to direct and balance the jury's inquiry.
In order to avoid the problems with the current definition, the just
cause instruction should provide the factfinder with strict guidelines
for reviewing termination decisions.61 The factfinder should first
determine if the employer stipulated the kinds of conduct that would
lead to termination. If the conduct was stipulated, the factfinder's
review of the employer's reason for the discharge ends here; the con-
duct becomes just cause for dismissal as a result of the employment
agreement.62
If the conduct was not stipulated, the factflnder should determine if
the employee's alleged conduct is the kind of conduct that a reason-
able employer in similar circumstances would consider grounds for
discharge. Using a reasonableness standard gives the factfmnder an
objective guideline for determining just cause. The objective nature of
this definition requires the jury to focus on the reason for the discharge
and prohibits any inquiry into the plaintiff's personal circumstances.
Unlike the "fair and honest cause or reason" jury instruction,63 a rea-
sonable employer instruction would not ask the jury to determine
whether the employer was fair. Rather, it would ask for an evaluation
of whether or not the conduct that gave rise to the dismissal is the
HEYLMAN & R. DUSTON, WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL GUIDE ON
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 23 (1989).
Other commentators have recognized the jury's propensity to sympathize with employees. See
Blades, supra note 4, at 1428 ("[Tlhere is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and
therefore believe, the employee."); Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA.
L. REV. 123, 129 (1985) ("[Jluries [have the] potential to arbitrarily and capriciously decide
cases according to their prejudices .... "); Comment, supra note 9, at 531 n.14.
61. See Kotler, supra note 60, at 129. Restricting the jury's scope of review has been an
accepted method for securing the uniformity and predictability of jury decisions and preventing
jury abuses. Id.
62. The employer has the right to determine the kind of conduct that will result in discharge
as long as the employer's rules are "reasonably related to achieving efficient operation and
maintaining order and are not manifestly unfair or do not unnecessarily burden employees'
rights." Summers, supra note 1, at 502; accord Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897 (1980) ("The employer's standard of job performance can be made
part of the contract."); C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 145. For instance, an
employer cannot specify that employees will be discharged for serving jury duty or protesting
corporate policy. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (at-will employee who alleged he was discharged in retaliation for his insistence that his
employer comply with the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act stated a cause of action for wrongful
discharge); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employer who discharged
employee because she served jury duty against the employer's wishes was liable for wrongful
discharge).
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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kind of behavior that justifies discharge. A reasonable employer defi-
nition for just cause is the first step toward providing more ceftainty in
the workplace.
III. THE JURY'S SCOPE OF REVIEW: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DE NOVO AND GOOD
FAITH STANDARDS
A new definition for just cause solves only the first part of the just
cause problem. What remains to be resolved is who should decide
whether or not just cause existed-the employer or the jury. As Tous-
saint, Simpson, and Baldwin illustrate, there is substantial conflict
among jurisdictions regarding the jury's scope of review 'in just cause
cases. This lack of consensus ensures that already crowded court
dockets will continue to be flooded by wrongful discharge litigation."4
Wrongful discharge legislation has been proposed65 to relieve the pres-
sure on the courts. Instead of alleviating the problem, however, this
legislation, if passed, will only magnify it." Relief will come only in
the form of a clear and uniform standard of review. In order to select
that standard, analysis of the costs and benefits associated with both
the de novo and good faith standards is necessary.
A. The De Novo Standard: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
L Benefit to Employees: Enhanced Job Security
Power in the employer-employee relationship is- far from equally
balanced. Although today's employers are less omnipotent than their
counterparts of the early 1900s,67 employers still maintain substantial
control over company operations, work environment and conditions of
employment. The result of this imbalance is that few private industry
employees have any opportunity to negotiate for job security.6 8 Those
64. Each year, an estimated two million Americans are discharged from their jobs.
Approximately 150,000 may have been discharged without just cause. Stieber, Recent
Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. LJ. 557, 558 (1985).
65. The Commission on Uniform State Laws has proposed a Uniform Employment
Termination Act. The text of the proposed act can be found at 90 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1
(May 9, 1990).
66. The proposed Uniform Act fails to specify whether employers would be judged by a de
novo or good faith standard. One of the drafters of the act suggested that if arbitrators could
"flesh out" a standard for just cause, so could the courts. St. Antoine, supra note 6,. at 71.
However, as demonstrated, the courts have been unable to "flesh out" a uniform standard. What
took arbitrators several years to develop may take even longer for the courts to develop if they
continue on their divergent paths.
67. See Massingale, supra note 6, at 202.
68. Blades, supra note 4, at 1411.
839
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who do are usually in upper level, managerial positions.6 9 The rest
must subject themselves to the severe consequences a wrongful dis-
charge can inflict on employees and their families.70
By allowing juries to review the factual circumstances surrounding
an employer's decision to terminate, the de novo standard adopted in
Toussaint enhances job security for all employees, regardless of their
individual bargaining power. This standard provides those employees
who have an implied just cause contract with substantially the same
measure of job security that union and civil service employees have
long enjoyed.71
A major difference remaining between private sector employees and
union and civil service employees is that the latter usually receive the
benefits of just cause in the context of an arbitration agreement,72
while private sector employees must litigate their claims. In arbitra-
tion, the discharging employer is required to make a full, fair and
objective investigation that considers all the available facts and evi-
dence regarding the discharge. 73  To demonstrate just cause for dis-
charge, the employer must prove74 that the employee engaged in the
alleged conduct.75 Probable cause for dismissal is insufficient.76
Under a de novo standard, employees with just cause agreements
receive the procedural advantages of arbitration, but in the environ-
69. Id. at 1411-12.
70. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
71. Summers, supra note 1, at 521-23.
72. See Fenn & Whelan, Job Security and the Role of Law: An Economic Analysis of
Employment-at-Will, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 353, 381 (1984). Arbitrators deciding a just cause
dispute under an arbitration agreement tend to focus on a list of conditions that should be
present to find a just cause discharge instead of relying on a blanket definition. The seven
conditions emphasized by arbitrators are: (1) the employee was forewarned about the
consequences of his conduct; (2) the employer's rule was reasonably related to the employer's
business operations and its expectations of employee performance; (3) the employer made a good
effort to discover if the employee did in fact violate the rules before discharging the employee;
(4) the company conducted a fair and objective investigation; (5) the employer obtained
substantial evidence that the employee was guilty as charged; (6) the employer applied its rules
evenhandedly and without discrimination; and (7) the penalty was reasonably related to the
seriousness of the offense and the employee's record with the company. In re Enterprise Wire
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359, 362-65 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.).
73. A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, JUsT CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 143 (1985).
74. The employer's burden of proof varies from case to case. In some cases, a preponderance
of the evidence burden is imposed. In re Roadway Express, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 224 (1990)
(Cooper, Arb.). In others, a clear and convincing evidence test is used. Id. If the employer
accuses the employee of criminal conduct, the arbitrator may require the employer to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 435, 439
(1990) (Alsher, Arb.).
75. A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, supra note 73, at 197.
76. Id. at 151.
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ment of the courtroom. Merging the requirements of-arbitration with
the dynamics of the courtroom is beneficial to employees. By giving
employees an opportunity to have the facts of their discharge reviewed
by a jury of their peers, the de novo standard could significantly
enhance job security in the United States.
2 The Cost to Employers: Diminished Managerial Discretion
The de novo standard imposes an immense cost on employers by
giving employees the advantages of arbitration in a courtroom setting.
Arbitration affords more benefits to its participants than does a jury
trial.77 With arbitration, participants receive a quick, 78 inexpensive79
and flexible80 resolution to their conflict. In contrast, wrongful dis-
charge cases can take years just to get into the courtroom,81 and, at the
conclusion of the trial, the remedy is usually limited to monetary com-
pensation. 2 In terms of both time and money,83 a courtroom proceed-
ing is more costly to employers than is arbitration.
Another advantage of arbitration over litigation is that arbitration
provides employees and employers with the experience of a specialized
tribunal" and the opportunity to select a mutually acceptable media-
tor.85 Courtroom proceedings do not provide either of these advan-
tages. In court, the parties to a wrongful discharge dispute have little
77. See Grodin, Past, Present and Future in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 LAB. LAW. 97, 104
(1990) ("If we expect to apply the kind of judgment that a labor arbitrator brings to bear in the
collective bargaining arena, then we need someone like an arbitrator to make that judgment.").
78. F. ELKOURI & B. ELKoui, How ARnrRATIoN WoRKs 8-10 (3d ed. 1973).
79. Id.
80. St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 79.
81. A study of 120 wrongful discharge trials in California determined that the average time to
get to trial was 38 months. J. DERTouzos, E. HOLLAND & P. EBENER, supra note 60, at 25.
82. Perritt, The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Clainm Where Does Employer Self Interest
Lie?, 58 U. CQN. L. REV. 397, 418 (1989).
83. A study of 120 wrongful discharge trials in California found that the average
compensatory award given to plaintiffs was $262,237. J. DERTouzos, E. HOLLAND & P.
EBENER, supra note 60, at 25-26. The final amount is often modified by post-trial activities. Id
at 33-35.
84. As a group, arbitrators are extremely well educated. Most have attended college and
many have obtained advanced degrees in economics and law. Arbitrators also bring a wealth of
experience to their positions. Prior to becoming arbitrators, many worked with unions, employer
associations, or the federal or a municipal government in a labor relations capacity. Somers &
Dennis, Survey of the Arbitration Profession in 1969, 24 ANNUAL MEETING OF NAT'L AcAD. OF
ARB. 275, 275-303 (1971).
85. F. ELKOUR & E. ELKOURI, supra note 78, at 87. In selecting an arbitrator, each side can
inquire into the knowledge, experience, specialty, and professional affiliations of an individual
arbitrator. See id. at 90-94. Parties can also research how an individual arbitrator has decided a
specific issue in the past. Idk
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choice regarding the jury members who are impaneled. 6 Further-
more, juries rarely bring any special knowledge of labor relations into
the courtroom; rather, the jury's knowledge is limited to what is
presented to them during trial.
The most significant advantage of arbitration is the arbitrator's abil-
ity to remain impartial.8 7 Although arbitrators are not entirely with-
out bias or prejudice, they can be expected to "divest [themselves] of
any personal inclinations and ... to stand between the parties with an
open mind."88 Juries may be less able to divorce themselves from their
personal biases. Each member of the jury brings his or her individual
prejudices into the process. Usually, a majority of the members of any
jury deciding a wrongful discharge case work as employees, rather
than in management.89 As a result, there is a potential for the jury to
"identify with, and therefore believe, the employee." 90 This potential
for bias is further compounded by the presence of a defendant with a
deep pocket. 91 In a close case, the jury may decide to impose liability
on the employer simply because the employer has ample resources.
Despite the shortcomings of the jury system in labor disputes, the de
novo standard vests broad discretion in the jury to second-guess cor-
porate decisions.92 A de novo standard allows the jury to review inde-
pendently employee conduct and to determine unilaterally whether
they believe such conduct warranted discharge. The broad inquiry
given the jury substantially restricts an employer's business judg-
ment.93 Because the de novo standard endorses the jury's strict scru-
tiny of employers' discharge decisions, employers are forced to weigh
every discharge against the risk of litigation.94
With a de novo standard, the risk of litigation is great. This stan-
dard discourages employers who operate hazardous businesses from
86. For example, in Washington each party can only exercise three peremptory challenges in
a civil case. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.44.130 (1989).
87. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 78, at 92.
88. Id.
89. Approximately 16% of civilian workers are in management positions. UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF LABOR, GEOGRAPHICAL PROFILE OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT table 3, at
10 (1988).
90. Blades, supra note 4, at 1428.
91. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 177, 195 (1989).
92. H. PERRrIr, supra note 4, at 355.
93. Hahn & Smith, Wrongful Discharge: The Search for a Legislative Compromise, 15
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 515, 529 (1990) ("[The de novo standard] decreases the flexibility
employers must have ... to make aggressive entrepreneurial decisions and unduly constrains
them from terminating employees in many cases in which the free exercise of good faith [and]
legitimate business judgment [would] dictate such action.").
94. Massingale, supra note 6, at 202.
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reacting to a potentially dangerous situation by immediately discharg-
ing a problem employee,95 but it'does not shield these employers from
the awesome liability they may incur if that employee causes an acci-
dent.96 This presents a significant dilemma for employers. If an
employer reasonably believes an employee could cause an accident
that would potentially harm another employee or the public, but fails
to discharge that employee, the employer can be held liable .for any
ensuing accident. Similarly, the employer that does discharge the
employee will be held liable for wrongful discharge if a jury later
determines the employer was mistaken regarding the facts.
Even employers who adequately investigate and document an
employee's objectionable behavior before the discharge are subject to
the risk of litigation. The de novo standard encourages employees
who were justifiably discharged to initiate vexatious suits.9 7 An
employee can easily state a claim for wrongful discharge. To get into
court, the employee simply must claim that he did not engage in the
alleged conduct. Once the employee states this claim, there are two
possible routes to success. First, the employer; fearful of a jury favor-
ing the employee, may agree to settle a claim that has little merit.98
Second, if the case goes to court, the jury may sympathize with the
employee and ignore the evidence relied on by the employer.99
The usual rationale for imposing the onerous burden of the de novo
standard on employers is that the employer can avoid the burden by
simply removing the just cause provision from its employment agree-
ments."co This rationale assumes that all just cause agreements are
explicit. A review of the case law shows that this is not the case.
Many just cause disputes are based on implied contracts resulting
from casual comments made by other employees in. some position of
95. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. "Is it fair (or safe) to put company officials to a choice between risking an
environmental catastrophe and a crushing jury verdict?" Id. at 215 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
97. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1428.
98. Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Wi ll-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?,
35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 229 (1982).
99. Wall, At Will Employment in Washington. A Review of Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.
and Its Progeny, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 71, 94 (1990):
A rule allowing juries to second guess the employer's decision... would- ... hold the
employer to a standard of perfection [and] ... would allow the employee a second chance to
challenge his termination before a fact finder who is likely to be more sympathetic and less
familiar with the actual conditions and practices of the workplace.
100. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408"Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896-97
(1980).
Washington Law Review
authority.101 The employer has little control over such situations.
Furthermore, if just cause legislation passes, employers will no longer
be able to remedy the situation as easily. 102
If a de novo standard is imposed on employers, the decision should
be removed from the jury. Even employee rights advocates who have
been instrumental in proposing just cause legislation recognize the
inequities 10 3 of allowing a jury to make a de novo review of employer
decisions. The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act1"4 discourages the use of jury trials by providing attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party if this party originally offered to submit the dis-
pute to arbitration and the losing party refused. 0 5 Likewise, arbitra-
tion is the preferred mode of enforcement under the proposed Uniform
Employment Termination Act."06
3. Costs to Employees: The Price of Enhanced Job Security
Although employees are perceived to "win" if a de novo standard is
adopted, they may pay for their enhanced job security through
decreased wages and diminished privacy. The employer may be the
better party to bear the costs associated with wrongful discharge, 10 7
but the employer's costs must be funded from some source, and wages
are a likely target. 1 8 Employee privacy may also suffer with a de novo
standard, especially if employers adopt widespread surveillance tech-
niques to monitor employee conduct. 109
101. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (1985).
102. The trend has been for legislation to not specify the standard of just cause by which
employers will be judged. See Proposed Uniform Employment Termination Act, 90 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) D-1 (May 9, 1990); Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902 to -914 (1989).
103. Grodin, supra note 77, at 104; St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 69.
104. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902 to -914 (1989).
105. Id. § 914.
106. 90 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (May 9, 1990).
107. Hahn & Smith, supra note 93, at 529.
108. See Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-will Employment Contract. An Interest and Cost
Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. Rv. 327 (1984); see also Note, Employer Opportunism and the
Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 510, 524-25 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
Employer Opportunism]; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1829 n.77 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Protecting At Will Employees] ("[T]his improvement is neither free nor bought solely at the
employer's expense.").
109. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 217 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) ("For the right to have a jury second-guess management's termination decisions, my




4. Impact on Society: The Costs Outweigh the Benefits
The impact of the de novo standard for just cause extends beyond
the confines of the employment relationship into the public domain.
Although society is likely to profit from an overall increase in job
security, the costs associated with this standard outweigh the benefit.
The public will be forced to pay the price of this increased job security
when employers increase the costs of their goods and services to offset
the resulting inefficiencies, when an employee retained by an employer
fearful of a wrongful termination dispute causes an accident,110 and
when the courts become burdened with wrongful discharge litiga-
tion."' The public may not be willing to bear these costs. Critics of
the civil service system believe that civil service employees receive too
much protection from their just cause provision." 2 Because the de
novo standard provides private employees with something resembling
civil service tenure," 3 the public may be unwilling to extend de novo
protection to all employees.
B. The Good Faith Standard: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
Despite the immense costs of the de novo standard, courts and legis-
latures are not justified in turning to the other alternative and adopting
an employer good faith standard. This standard comes with its own
inequities. While the good faith standard safeguards managerial dis-
cretion, it destroys any hope of employee job security.
1. Benefit to Employers: A Presumption of Just Cause
The good faith standard is beneficial to employers. As illustrated in
Simpson, the good faith standard protects management's ability to
make discharge decisions as long as the employer did not contract
away its decision-making authority."' This standard allows employ-
ers to retain broad managerial discretion and to benefit from the
increased productivity and employee loyalty that result from the
employer's illusory promise of just cause treatment.' 5
110. Id
111. See Note, Employer Opportunism, supra note 108, at 527 ("[A]nywhere between 30,000
and 103,000 claims could be filed under a general good cause statute.").
112. H. PEaarrr, supra note 4, at 354 n.35.
113. Id at 354.
114. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 101, 643 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1982); see
supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
115. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
("Having announced [a just cause] policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of
improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer
may not treat its promise as illusory.").
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The broad managerial discretion obtained under a good faith stan-
dard comes at too great a cost to employee job security. An
employer's subjective, good faith belief alone is not enough to justify
discharge. If this were all that was required, employers would have
little incentive to exercise proper care in investigating alleged miscon-
duct. 116 Instead, employers could always rely on a good faith belief
that such conduct really occurred. The "arbitrary, capricious or ille-
gal reason" language included in the good faith standard would do
little to protect employees because this language goes solely to the rea-
son given for the discharge, not to the employer's reasonableness or
justification.
By limiting the review of an employer's discharge decision to an
evaluation of the employer's state of mind, the good faith standard
establishes a presumption of just cause. In order to rebut this pre-
sumption, the employee has the difficult burden of demonstrating a
lack of good faith on the part of the employer. Although other corpo-
rate decisions are protected by the business judgment rule that
presumes corporate officers' actions are taken in good faith,1 17 the
stakes involved in discharging employees are too high to grant
employers such an extensive advantage.
2. Cost to Employees: Economic and Emotional Turmoil
A good faith standard for just cause does little to protect employees
from unjust employer action. Despite a just cause agreement, an
employer is free to discharge an employee so long as the employer has
a good faith belief that the employee engaged in the prohibited con-
duct. The employer is under no duty to document employee behavior
or to conduct an investigation.
By limiting the jury's review of employers' discharge decisions, the
good faith standard poses severe consequences for employees. Dis-
charge subjects employees to economic as well as psychological tur-
moil. 118 For many workers, their jobs are their main source of identity
and their primary social unit.119 Discharges deprive employees of the
self-esteem they derive from their jobs, often leading to feelings of fail-
ure.120 These feelings of failure can spread beyond the employee's pro-
116. The Simpson holding does not expressly require an investigation of the facts or any
evidence on which to hinge the decision to discharge. See Simpson, 643 P.2d 1276.
117. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
118. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's Perspective, 67






fessional capacity into his or her personal life. Studies of employees
dismissed because of plant closures document the mental and physical
health conditions that can accompany a job loss. 2 ' Problems associ-
ated with loss of employment can include alcoholism, ulcers, suicides,
cardiovascular deaths and impaired social relationships.122
Like the emotional costs, the economic costs of job loss are also
severe. The average worker has less than three months wages in sav-
ings.123 Loss of income and lack of savings can lead to financial
problems as severe as repossession and foreclosure. The economic
consequences of discharge are not limited to lost, wages, but also
include lost health benefits, lost retirement benefits, lost vacation time
and the cost of finding new employment. 2 The problem is even more
dramatic for older employees and employees without transferable
skills.'2 5 Also, if an employee is discharged for alleged misconduct,
unemployment benefits may be denied, making it even harder to
cope. 126
As with the de novo standard, the costs of the good faith standard
are too great. The good faith standard unjustifiably favors employers.
Employees and their families should not be subject to a rule that
makes undeserved economic and emotional turmoil a reality, and a
reality for which they have little recourse.
IV. THE NEED FOR A BALANCING TEST
Both the de novo and good faith standards for just cause are inequi-
table. Each tips the scale in favor-of the interests of one party while
ignoring the needs and vulnerabilities of the other. An analysis of the
just cause standard demonstrates that there are a number of interests
at stake. First, employees need protection against unfair and injurious
employer action.' 2 7 In .addition, society is interested in the fair treat-
121. See St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 67 (citing H. BRENNER, FSTIMATING THE SOCIAL
COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
HEALTH AND CLINICAL AGGRESSION (1976); B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 63-66 (1982); L. FERMAN & J. GoRDus, THE ECONOMY
AND MENTAL HEALTH (1979); L. FERMAN, M. A.cEN & H. SHEPPARD, ECONOMIC FAILURE,
ALIENATION, AND EXTREMISM (1968)).
122. Id.
123. Tobias, supra note 118, at 181.
124. Id; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 108, at 1834.
125. Blades, supra note 4, at 1420; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 335, 339 (1974).
126. Blades, supra note 4, at 1406. The severity of the effects of wrongful discharge have led
some to label it the "organizational equivalent of capital punishment." I. at 1406 n. 11.
127. H. PERRrrr, supra note 4, at 353-54.
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ment of employees as well as organizational efficiency. 2' Finally,
employers must be able to effectively manage their organizations. 129 A
fair standard for just cause must balance all these competing interests.
A. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc- A Balancing Test for Just
Cause
In Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc., 130 the Washington Supreme
Court merged the de novo and good faith standards in order to bal-
ance employer and employee interests. The court held that "dis-
charge for 'just cause' is one which is not for any arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) supported by sub-
stantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be
true." '131 The first clause of the definition, "not for any arbitrary, 32
capricious13 3 or illegal reason," establishes the good faith component
of the balancing test. This clause focuses solely on the employer's rea-
son for the discharge. Under this clause of the balancing test, only
discharges that are unreasonable or made in bad faith are prohibited.
Without the rest of the holding, the Baldwin test would not offer
employees any more protection than is offered in Simpson. However,
the second and third clauses, "based on facts supported by substantial
evidence" and "reasonably believed by the employer to be true," pro-
vide the protective element. These clauses establish a two-part objec-
tive test. In order for the employer to avoid liability for wrongful
termination, the factfinder must determine that the employer had sub-
stantial evidence' that the alleged conduct occurred and that it was
reasonable for the employer to rely on this evidence. "Substantial evi-
dence" is an elusive term. Generally, it means "[s]uch evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion...
evidence possessing something of substance and relevant consequence
... which furnishes [a] substantial basis of fact from which [the] issues
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). For further discussion of Baldwin v. Sisters of
Providence, Inc., see Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of
the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719 (1991).
131. Id. at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
132. Arbitrary is defined as "[i]n an unreasonable manner... depending on will alone... bad
faith." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1990).
133. Capricious means made on a whim, based on an unfounded motivation. See &l at 211.
134. The Baldwin court did not state whether an independent factfinder or the employer
would decide if substantial evidence exists. See Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
In order to balance the interests of the employer and the employee, this decision must be left to
an independent factfinder. If this decision is left to the employer, the substantial evidence




tendered can be reasonably re~olved. ' 135 The substantial evidence
requirement asks if an independent party, examining the facts relied
on by the employer, could reach the same conclusion. The "reason-
ably believed to be true" clause asks whether there were any circum-
stances that should have discouraged the employer from relying on
those facts, or whether the employer was using those facts as a pretext
and the discharge was really for another reason. By focusing the jury's
inquiry on the evidence relied on by the employer rather than on the
employer's good faith or the facts as they appear after the discharge,
the Baldwin test goes far in balancing the interests of employers and
employees.
B. A Balancing Test Will Lead to More Equitable Results
A standard like the one announced in Baldwin is necessary to effec-
tively balance employer and employee interests. A balancing test is
superior to the de novo standard because it limits the jury's scope of
review to scrutinizing the specific facts and evidence relied on by the
employer, instead of allowing the jury to determine de novo what, in
their judgment, really occurred. A balancing test also satisfies
employer concerns regarding the excessive costs imposed by the de
novo standard. Unlike the de novo standard, a balancing test imposes
a reasonable employer requirement. In deciding to discharge an
employee, employers are required to incur only those costs that a rea-
sonable employer would incur. If a reasonable employer, in the same
circumstances, would not engage in techniques such as widespread
drug testing or planting an informant in order to ascertain the facts,
then the discharging employer is not held liable for not doing so.
Likewise, a reasonable employer standard also considers public policy
issues. Under a balancing test, employees suspected of misconduct do
not need to be retained if doing so could lead to serious consequences
for the business or the public. If a reasonable employer in the same
circumstances would have discharged the employee to avoid the possi-
ble adverse consequences, the employer will not be held liable for
doing so.
A balancing test also satisfies employee concerns regarding unfair
employer action. A balancing test, as opposed to a good faith stan-
dard, forces employers to account for their decisions. If the employer
fails to review all the available facts prior to the discharge, the balanc-
ing test takes this failure into consideration and imposes liability. The
benefit of such a standard is that it requires an employer to conduct a
135. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 132, at 1428.
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fair investigation and to make an independent review of the facts
before dismissing the employee. 136 A balancing test prohibits employ-
ees from being discharged unless there is compelling proof to support
the employer's action. 137 The employer's good faith alone is not
enough; the employer is required to compile evidence from which a
reasonable mind would conclude that discharge was justified. A bal-
ancing test should allay fears that anything short of a de novo stan-
dard would allow employers to dismiss employees on a mere suspicion
of misconduct.1 38
V. CONCLUSION
Within the past decade, the just cause definition and the standard of
review in just cause cases have captured the attention of courts, legis-
latures, employee rights advocates and employment law commenta-
tors. Just cause definitions formulated by the courts have suffered
from ambiguity and inconsistency. A clear definition that gives strict
guidelines to the jury and limits the jury's inquiry to whether a reason-
able employer would consider the conduct just cause for discharge is
necessary.
A clear articulation of the jury's scope of review in just cause cases
is also needed. Courts should follow the example of the Washington
Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, Inc., and adopt a
balancing test. A balancing test is beneficial to employers because it
limits the jury's ability to second-guess employer decisions. Likewise,
employees benefit from a balancing test because it protects them from
arbitrary dismissals based on insufficient evidence. A standard that
balances the employer's interest in managerial discretion against the
employee's interest in job security will ensure fairness in the
workplace.
Wendi J Delmendo
136. Wall, supra note 99, at 94.
137. See Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988) (an employer has no
reasonable grounds for discharge where the employer improperly relied on an investigator's
summarized report not intended to stand on its own, failed to differentiate between firsthand
knowledge and hearsay, gossip, or rumor, and made no attempt to ascertain the credibility of
people interviewed), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989).
138. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
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